The lack of an integrated biometrics system in India is being ruthlessly exploited by forgers, criminals and illegal immigrants. Bismee Taskin has written a super interesting article on how the fact that India’s Aadhar database and the country’s passport database do not talk to each other is hurting the country. Specifically, this is allowing criminals to get genuine passports (with the criminal’s original biometrics) issued but under assumed identities (which are in turn validated using fake Aadhar IDs, fake voter IDs and fake bank passbooks):
“If someone applies for a passport using their Aadhaar—one of the common documents used in passport applications—the Aadhaar number of the applicant and biometrics are validated with the Aadhaar database for verification.
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) does not share Aadhaar photographs with passport authorities.
Investigators probing such cases mainly point to lacunae in the system, and the lack of integration in terms of biometrics, between different databases like passport and Aadhaar.”
Ms Taskin gives several examples of criminals who have pulled of this trick to travel in and out of India successfully. Here is one example:
“Last year, a double murder case related to gang rivalry stumped the Delhi Police after the main accused, Harsh alias Chintu, vanished into thin air.
The shootout took place at a salon in Najafgarh on 9 February 2024. Chintu, a member of the Gogi gang, an ally of the Lawrence Bishnoi gang, was allegedly the main shooter. Two rival gang members perished. And Chintu was not to be seen again.
The case remained in cold storage for months, until the Delhi Police got intel that Chintu had fled from Amritsar to Dubai, and was most likely in Baku. Armed with this crumb of a tip-off, they began to scour three months of records of air passengers who had travelled this route.
The police knew a Look Out Circular in this case would be pointless as he had most likely fled the country under a false identity. They made countless calls to passengers to figure out if one of them could be their man, but without success. Until one person stood out as suspicious.
This passenger was Pradeep Kumar. A police team visited his Jalandhar address, but found no one by the name. The contact number provided by the airline was unreachable as well.
What really set off alarm bells was the information that his passport was issued on 26 March 2024, just weeks after the Najafgarh double murder, under the tatkal scheme.
The Delhi Police then issued a Look Out Circular in the name of Pradeep Kumar. In November, he landed at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, and was immediately taken into custody. The detainee was indeed their man, Chintu. He had changed his appearance, but matched the photo the police had.
Here’s the kicker: Chintu’s passport wasn’t technically fake. He had even provided his own biometrics. But the documents he submitted as identity proof—Aadhaar, voter ID, even a Punjab National Bank passbook—had fake addresses, phone numbers, all under the name Pradeep Kumar, but with his own photograph.
In a nutshell, this Pradeep Kumar, didn’t exist.
That’s how easily Chintu, who is facing multiple cases of extortion and even a double murder charge, escaped the country.”
Once the reader has understood this basic construct, Ms Taskin then ramps up your stress level another notch by explaining that criminals can get genuine Aadhar IDs and voter IDs issued under fake names:
“According to investigators, multiple stakeholders are involved in acquiring fake documents. These include travel agents, Aadhaar and PAN card agents, photocopy shop owners, post office staff, former employees of government offices and even police personnel. Agents hoard forged Aadhaar and PAN cards, or stolen or bought ID and address proof such as bank passbooks or electricity bills.
Sources in the government pointed to the main issue being in the system of document verification.
“There is no way to detect them because they are so well forged. Original Aadhaar and PAN cards are used under a new identity. Most times, there is no previous official record of the person under their original identity to verify,” an RPO official said on condition of anonymity.
The official added: “Take the case of the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar. They have used their actual photograph and biometrics from the beginning in most cases for obtaining voter, Aadhaar or PAN cards. Others use original Aadhaar cards but change the name and photograph. The RPO office is primarily dependent on the first two steps for issuance of the passports.”
Ms Taskin explains that the forged ID industry is large, well-organised, well-funded and networked seamlessly across India and into most of the countries where the diaspora is based: “In the case of illegal immigrants, investigators said that in most cases, all documents are forged. Agents from Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, West Bengal etc. have been found to be working together. The end result is—a completely new identity, with fake documents, fake names, but original biometrics and photographs.
“The system is so flawed and corrupt that one person can have multiple Aadhaars based on two different addresses. UIDAI rejects multiple enrolments but agents often bypass this by using prints of different fingers during the capturing process.”
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